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The European Monetary System and the
European Currency Unit
Probably the most significant event in the European Economic Com-
munity in 1978 was the decision to enact the European Monetary System
(EMS) in 1979.1 During the long, technical arguments in the autumn of
1978, all nine heads of government of the European Community moved to
and fro across the continent in the most intensive period of bilateral di-
plomacy in at least six years.2 In fact, the efforts that went into the prep-
aration for the EMS kept the European Commission so occupied during
the second half of 1978 that it fell behind in proposing major legislation it
had planned to submit.3 The EMS could be the most significant develop-
ment in the world of international finance since President Nixon officially
launched floating exchange rates in 1971 by cutting the dollar free from
gold.'
The EMS is the European Community's latest effort to come to grips
with exchange rate stability as a means toward full integration and har-
monization of the economies of the member states.5 It is three steps in
one towards a European central bank, a European monetary union, and a
common European currency. The EMS aims to replace national control
over domestic economic policy, particularly monetary policy, within the
European Economic Community by multinational control. Each country
will surrender a part of its sovereignty in economic affairs in return for
help from, and a say in, the policies of the others.
The EMS is composed of a parity grid, a divergence indicator, and
credit mechanisms. The parity grid defines the bilateral central rates' and
the permitted margins of fluctuation on either side of these central rates.
The EMS specifies a band of 2.25 percent above and below the central
rates for all EMS currencies, except for the Italian Lira, which is permit-
1. [1979] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), The Euromarket News, Jan. 4, 1979, at 1.
2. EUROPE, Jan./Feb. 1979, at 8.
3. [1979] COMM. MKT. REP., supra note 1, at 1.
4. BusINEss WEEK, Nov. 6, 1978, at 68.
5. The United Kingdom decided not to join the EMS as a full member. However, it
forms a part of the ECU, it has transferred its share of its reserves to the European Mone-
tary Fund, and it has pledged to maintain a "stable" exchange rate. THE EcONOMIST, Mar.
17, 1979, at 74. Ireland is also a member of the EMS. The move was particularly interesting
because it marked the end of the one-for-one parity between the British and Irish pounds, a
relationship that had been unbroken for nearly 160 years. Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1978, at 19,
col. 1.
6. Bilateral central rates are defined by governments. Market exchange rates are those
at which currencies are actually traded against one another by banks, corporations, or in-
directly in foreign exchange markets. To keep market exchange rates where they want them,
governments must influence their supply of and demand for their currencies by intervening
directly in the foreign exchange markets.
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ted a six percent band.' When the market rate for any currency pair
reaches its limit, both central banks are obliged to intervene in participat-
ing currencies, to keep the currency within the band.8 The system ex-
pressly provides for adjustments of exchange rate relationships between
participating countries by means of changes in central rates, which are
subject to the consent of all participants.9
The European Currency Unit (ECU) is at the heart of an alternative
exchange rate mechanism to the parity grid system, called the divergence
indicator. The ECU is not a true currency, but rather a "basket" of cur-
rencies, containing specific quantities of the European currencies. They
are chosen according to criteria that supposedly reflect the relative size of
their economies, of their intra-European trade, national productivity and
quotas in support mechanisms.10 These accounts are also subject to
change by unanimous agreement of the member states. The maximum
divergence represents an outer limit of permissible foreign exchange rate
movement, and the EMS has fixed a "trigger" at seventy-five percent of
the maximum. The divergence indicator obliges no government to take
specific action, although there is a "presumption" that adequate correc-
tive measures will be taken.
11
The EMS also provides for credit mechanisms in order to intervene
in the foreign exchange markets. Credit to support the EMS is dispersed
through three mechanisms ranging from very short-term credit to me-
dium-term financial assistance. About twenty-five billion ECU's are effec-
tively available for credit." To create an initial stock of ECU's, each
member was required -to deposit at least twenty percent of its holdings of
dollars and gold in a "European Monetary Fund," against which it re-
ceives and equivalent amount of ECU's.13
In its two-year history, the EMS has performed rather well. Despite
the sharp crude oil price rises, the average fluctuation of each national
currency in 1979 amounted to only 1.9 percent compared to 5.2 percent
during the preceding six years. That made 1979 the most stable year for
EEC currencies since 1972.14 Aside from two minor adjustments in the
exchange rates in September and November 1979, there have been no
other events to mar the system's operation. 5 Additionally, the New Coin-
7. Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1978, at 10, col. 3.
8. Intervention in participating currencies is compulsory when the intervention points
defined by the fluctuation margins are reached. Res. No. 32/1978, Dec. 8, 1978, of the Euro-
pean Council, [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), I 10,095.
9. Id.
10. Carreau, Vers Une Zone de Stabilito Mon~taire: la Creation du System montaire
Europeen au Sein de la CEE, REvUE DU MARCHt. COMMUN, Sept. 26, 1979, at 413.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. MONETARY REPORT OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, Mar. 1979.
13. See note 8 supra.
14. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 1980, at 56.
15. The finance ministers of the EMS raised the value of the Deutsche Mark two per-
cent against six other EMS currencies and five percent against the Danish Krone in the first
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munity Instrument (NCI or the Ortoli Facility), was officially instituted
by a decision of the European Council on October 16, 1978.6 It was de-
cided to allow less prosperous member states to borrow a maximum of
five million ECU's for a period of five years, divided into annual install-
ments of one million ECU's, and to allow member states a three percent
interest rate subsidy. The first loans from the resources of the NCI were
signed in Brussels on December 17, 1979, and were made to Ireland, Italy,
and the United Kingdom. The loans are for investments in energy
schemes, water and sewerage infrastructures, and road and telecommuni-
cation improvements.
The concept of a European monetary system is neither new nor
novel. Informal arrangements linking European currencies have existed in
one form or another since the beginning of the twentieth century, and
more formal arrangements have existed since the Second World War. In
fact, one of the ultimate goals of the European Economic Community,
which came into existence on January 1, 1958, was the attainment of a
European Monetary System. But one of the fundamental obstacles in ex-
amining the Articles of the Treaty of Rome relating to monetary policy is
the very limited nature of the commitments they contain in contrast to
other often exacting obligations of other sections of the Treaty. Article
107 is the only treaty provision relating directly to foreign exchange rate
policy.
17
The EMS is a sign that Europe's slow march toward greater eco-
nomic unity has not yet been arrested. By tying their currencies together
and by creating a new reserve unit, the Europeans may hope to build a
new global monetary order composed of three currency blocs: the dollar,
the ECU, and the yen."8 In addition, a common currency, which will un-
doubtedly become attractive to others for private transactions and official
reserve purposes, might enhance Europe's bargaining strength in interna-
tional monetary discussions. To do this, the ECU would have to move
from its present status as an accounting unit, designed to help the eight
members maintain a reasonably stable exchange rate system, and into the
realignment of the six-month old EMS, on September 24, 1979. Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1979,
at 4, col. 1. The second realignment of the EMS currencies took place on November 30,
1979, when the Danish government devalued its krone by five percent against the other
currencies of the EMS. BuLL. EuR. COMM. (CCH), Nov. 1979, at 30.
16. O.J. EUR. COMM. 298, Oct. 25, 1978.
17. Article 107 provides:
Each member state shall treat its policy with regard to rates of exchange as a
matter of common concern. If a member state makes an alteration in its rate of
exchange which is inconsistent with the objectives set out in Article 104 and
which seriously distorts conditions of cooperation, the Commission may, after
consulting the Monetary Committee, authorize other member states to take for
a strictly limited period the necessary measures, the conditions and details of
which it shall determine, in order to counter the consequences of such
alternatives.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 57.
18. LE NouvL OnsEvATmu, Mar. 12, 1979, at 44.
1980
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hands of commercial banks. From there it would not be a large step for
the ECU to become real money. It would, however, be a considerably
larger step for it to become a world-wide reserve currency. The develop-
ment in the past fifteen years of various units of account (official ones like
the Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund, and a
number of privately computed ones) for such purposes has not been par-
ticularly encouraging; acceptance has been slow and halting on the whole.
Yet, the possibility cannot be ruled out that after a certain lead-in period
the ECU might do better.
Though timely exchange rate adjustments will be required to make
the EMS work in the medium term, over a longer period the ambition is
to move forward to a system requiring fewer and fewer adjustments and
eventually into a ture monetary union. Real progress toward that goal will
require a very considerable harmonization of economic policies, of which
the coordination of monetary policy will be paramount. The real bar to
European economic integration is the fact that the currencies of the
member states are still not fully convertible with each other. The strength
of Western Europe as a political and economic entity depends upon their
ability of member states to perceive common problems and to act to-
gether toward their solution, and to create in a concrete way a factual
solidarity among them to establish common bases for their economic, so-
cial, and political development. In view of the instability in the world
economy, it seems that full economic and monetary integration in West-
ern Europe will remain a long-term aim, rather than a practical consider-
ation in the 1980's.
John H. Works, Jr.
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